Research Guides: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion: General

Advice for Crafting an Anti-Racist Law School

Conway, Danielle M. and Saidman-Krauss, Bekah and Schreiber, Rebecca, Building an Antiracist Law School: Inclusivity in Admissions and Retention of Diverse Students—Leadership Determines DEI Success (March 13, 2021). Rutgers Race and the Law Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3804022 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804022

The article discusses how faculty at Penn State Dickinson Law School leads an economic, social, and political reform of the school. The article discusses how professors must exhibit leadership and work to undo the systemic racism and biases present in the legal field.

This is the first of the series of 3 articles that discuss how Penn State addressed the change in the law school environment. This is a great resource to start a discussion on how SLU can work to change and adopt similar practices.

Calling out vs. Calling-in

This Book is Anti-Racist: 20 Lessons on How to Wake Up, Take Action and Do the Work by Tiffany Jewell. Available via MOBIUS request

This Book is Anti-Racist: 20 Lessons on How to Wake Up, Take Action and Do the Work by Tiffany Jewell. Available via MOBIUS request

Tiffany Jewell’s excellent book, “This Book is Anti-Racist: 20 Lessons on How to Wake Up, Take Action and Do the Work” offers a reflection process when you may have to confront racism. Jewell identifies two processes for confronting racist statements/behaviors: “calling out” or “calling in.” Calling someone out is an approach that holds a person publicly accountable. Calling Someone in when we set aside time to talk with someone about their offending statement/behavior.

This Book is Anti-Racist: 20 Lessons on How to Wake Up, Take Action and Do the Work by Tiffany Jewell. Available via MOBIUS request

Jewel offers a few reflections that may be helpful for instructors in any teaching situation:

Who has the power in this situation? The person I’m calling in/out, or me? (If you have the power in this situation, consider calling them in.)
Am I calling out a person or systemic behavior? (If you’re calling out systemic behavior or an institution, call them out.)
How much energy and emotional labor am I able to share right now? (If you don’t have the energy or aren’t willing to put in the emotional labor it takes to educate someone and work with them to change, consider calling them in with someone who can take on the work you are not able to do. I have a friend who helps me out when I don’t have the capacity to educate white people on racial oppression.)
Is this person likely to change their problematic behavior? (If they are not, call them out. If this is someone you’ve called in before and they’re still repeating their actions, call them out.)
Who is in the room? Who am I accountable to in this moment? Am I centering the needs of myself or the group? What will happen if I call this behavior out? What will happen if I call this person in?
What am I hoping to accomplish with this call-in or call-out?

This Book is Anti-Racist: 20 Lessons on How to Wake Up, Take Action and Do the Work by Tiffany Jewell. Available via MOBIUS request

Coercive Sterilization

Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789

Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789

Madrigal v. Quilligan was a civil rights class action lawsuit filed by 10 Mexican American women against the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center for involuntary or forced sterilization. The plaintiffs involved in Madrigal v. Quilligan were residents of East Los Angeles, a predominantly Latinx population with inadequate medical and educational resources. Unauthorized sterilizations among Mexican women with minimal English proficiency rose at the County Medical Center during the 1970s. Among the victims were Dolores Madrigal, who claimed that doctors pressured her into signing a sterilization consent form while she was in labor, and Jovita Rivera, who signed the concession document without being counseled on the consequences of sterilization.

Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789

Although the hospital won the case, some progress was still made. Madrigal was able to help change the state laws to require Spanish translations of the sterilization booklet. They also were able to get the California Department of health to create a seventy-two hour waiting period for sterilization.

Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789

Discussion of coerced sterilization of minority women; racial stigmas based on language barriers and expressed prejudice against immigrant women

Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789

Disparate Impact

Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786, 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 10, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7632

Mark A. Levin & Kallista Hiraoka, Gender and Law Scholarship in the Law in Japan Field: A Comprehensive Bibliographic Study, 21 APLPJ 1 (2019).

Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786, 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 10, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7632

Rawlinson (plaintiff), a 22-year-old woman with college training in correctional psychology, applied for a position as a correctional counselor trainee in Alabama. An Alabama statute required that state correctional facility employees maintain a minimum weight of 120 pounds and have a minimum height of 5 foot 2 inches. Correctional counselors’ primary duty was to maintain security and control over inmates through constant supervision and observation. In addition to the height and weight requirements, correctional counselors were required to have a valid Alabama driver’s license and a high school or equivalent degree, have no physical defects, and fall between the ages of 20.5 and 45 years at the time of employment. Outside these criteria, correctional counselors were selected by merit, based on education and prior experience. They were not subject to any written exam. Rawlinson was denied employment because she did not meet the minimum weight requirement. She sued the Alabama Board of Corrections (the State) (defendant) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that the statutory height and weight requirements, though facially neutral, functionally operated to disproportionately exclude women from employment in the State’s correctional facilities. The district court found that when combined, Alabama’s statutory height and weight requirements would exclude 41.13 percent of the United States female population but less than 1 percent of its male population. The district court concluded that Rawlinson made a prima facie showing of unlawful sex discrimination, which the State did not sufficiently rebut. The State appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the district court erroneously permitted Rawlinson to rely on generalized national statistics to make a prima facie case rather than requiring more specific statistical evidence about actual correctional counselor applicants in Alabama. The State further argued it had successfully rebutted Rawlinson’s prima facie case by showing that the height and weight requirements were job related.