Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
Tatiana Tarasoff was a student at the University of California, Berkeley, under the leadership of the Regents of University of California (Regents) (defendant). She and her fellow student, Prosenjit Poddar, briefly shared a romantic interaction on New Year’s Eve 1968. After that, Tarasoff was unresponsive to Poddar’s advances and dated other men. This all aggravated Poddar, and he went to see Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed at the university’s medical center. Poddar confessed to Moore that he intended to kill Tatiana. Moore diagnosed Poddar as suffering from a mental disorder and recommended he be involuntarily committed for a short time. Poddar was released, however, after he appeared rational. Moore’s boss allegedly told him not to have any further involvement with the case. At no point did anyone associated with the Regents warn Tatiana or her parents of possible danger. On October 27, 1969, Poddar killed Tatiana in her home. Tatiana’s parents, the Tarasoffs (plaintiffs) brought suit against the Regents alleging they were negligence in failing to warn them of the danger to Tatiana. The trial court held for the Regents, and the Tarasoffs appealed.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
When a therapist learns from his patient about intent to do harm to a third party, the therapist has a duty to take reasonable precautions given the circumstances to warn the potential victim of danger.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
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Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
Rabin, Robert L., and Stephen D. Sugarman. 2003. Torts stories. New York: Foundation Press. (AVAILABLE VIA MOBIUS REQUEST)
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
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Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime - 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998)
A comparative negligence case was filed arising out of an accident in which Davenport, was injured while descending a stairway near his apartment. The owners of the apartment building brought a third-party claim against the company contracted to do landscaping and general maintenance work at the condominiums. The trial court directed a verdict against Davenport, finding he had assumed the risk of injury adopting South Carolina's comparative negligence analysis. On appeal, the property regime argued that the justification behind assumption of risk was not in conflict with South Carolina's comparative fault system.
Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime - 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998)
Express assumption of risk is contrasted with implied assumption of risk which arises when the plaintiff implicitly, rather than expressly, assumes known risks. Implied assumption of risk is characterized as either primary or secondary. Primary implied assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly assumes those risks that are inherent in a particular activity. Primary implied assumption of risk is not a true affirmative defense, but instead goes to the initial determination of whether the defendant's legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff.
Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime - 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998)
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Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime - 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998)
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Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime - 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998)
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O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship co. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 28 N.E. 266 (1891)
O’Brien (plaintiff) was an emigrant passenger on a steamship on her way to Boston. Once in Boston, only individuals with a certificate of vaccination were allowed to go ashore without being detained in quarantine. Cunard Steamship Company (Cunard) (defendant) customarily vaccinated all emigrants who wished to be vaccinated and provided them with a certificate of vaccination. Notices in this regard were posted on the ship in various languages. Approximately two hundred female passengers, including O’Brien, assembled to be vaccinated. The women formed a line to wait for the surgeon to examine each of their arms to determine if they had been previously vaccinated. O’Brien’s turn came and she showed the surgeon her arm. The surgeon informed her that she needed to be vaccinated. In response, O'Brien informed the surgeon that she had been vaccinated previously but it did not leave a mark on her arm. The surgeon then told O’Brien that he should vaccinate her again. O’Brien never told the surgeon that she did not want to be vaccinated. Subsequently, O’Brien held her arm up and was vaccinated by the surgeon, and the surgeon gave O’Brien a certificate of vaccination. After the vaccination, O’Brien experienced complications at the site of the vaccination and blistering all over her body. O’Brien sued Cunard for assault and the trial court directed a verdict for Cunard. O’Brien appealed to the trial court’s ruling to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789
Madrigal v. Quilligan was a civil rights class action lawsuit filed by 10 Mexican American women against the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center for involuntary or forced sterilization. The plaintiffs involved in Madrigal v. Quilligan were residents of East Los Angeles, a predominantly Latinx population with inadequate medical and educational resources. Unauthorized sterilizations among Mexican women with minimal English proficiency rose at the County Medical Center during the 1970s. Among the victims were Dolores Madrigal, who claimed that doctors pressured her into signing a sterilization consent form while she was in labor, and Jovita Rivera, who signed the concession document without being counseled on the consequences of sterilization.
O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship co. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 28 N.E. 266 (1891)
A party is not liable for assault if the alleged unlawful contact was justified or the accusing party otherwise consented to such contact.
Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789
Although the hospital won the case, some progress was still made. Madrigal was able to help change the state laws to require Spanish translations of the sterilization booklet. They also were able to get the California Department of health to create a seventy-two-hour waiting period for sterilization.
O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship co. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 28 N.E. 266 (1891)
discussion of women's experiences of being silenced by both the opposing parties and the legal systems historically
Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789
discussion of coerced sterilization of minority women; racial stigmas based on language barriers and expressed prejudice against immigrant women
O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship co. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 28 N.E. 266 (1891)
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Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789
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O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship co. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 28 N.E. 266 (1891)
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Madrigal v. Quilligan 639 F.2d 789
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Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Texas Supreme Court 424 S.W.2d 627 (1967)
Fisher (plaintiff) was attending a professional conference that included a buffet luncheon at the Carrousel Motor Hotel (defendant). While he was in line at the buffet Fisher was approached by an employee of the hotel. The employee snatched a plate out of Fisher’s hand and shouted a “Negro could not be served in the club.” The employee never actually touched Fisher’s body and Fisher was never in apprehension of injury despite being embarrassed in front of his colleagues. Fisher sued the hotel for damages. The jury returned a verdict in Fisher’s favor for $400 for his humiliation and for $500 for punitive damages. The trial court set aside the jury verdict in favor of the hotel. Fisher appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed the trial court decision. Fisher then appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Texas Supreme Court 424 S.W.2d 627 (1967)
A party is liable for damages for humiliation for an intentional offensive touching of anything connected with another individual and actual physical contact with the actual body of another is not required.
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Texas Supreme Court 424 S.W.2d 627 (1967)
racial disparities and outright battery based on race
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Texas Supreme Court 424 S.W.2d 627 (1967)
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Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Texas Supreme Court 424 S.W.2d 627 (1967)
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"California Bars the Calculation of Tort Damages Based on Race, Gender, and Ethnicity"
The article discusses the implications of California's decision to remove Race, Gender, and Ethnicity from damage calculations for loss of future earnings from personal injury. This new bill (took effect January 1, 2020) has wide implications of allowing women, people of color, and those of different ethnicities to have better access to attorneys and to have their wages calculated on an equal scale as their white, male counterparts.
How Race, Ethnicity and Gender Impact Your Life's Worth
Article discusses the implications of awarding damages based on Race, Ethnicity and Gender. The article states that calculations of damages based on these factors continue to severely limit certain communities, do not account for future progress in our nation, and hurt youth that may be claiming damages at a young age. The article also shares the history of how Race, Ethnicity and Gender damage calculations came to be, along with possible solutions to the problem.
"California Bars the Calculation of Tort Damages Based on Race, Gender, and Ethnicity"
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How Race, Ethnicity and Gender Impact Your Life's Worth
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California Bars the Calculation of Tort Damages Based on Race, Gender, and Ethnicity
This is a short article that could be used when discussing personal injury or loss of wage calculations. Can start a conversation about ethical duties of attorneys to take on cases that might not always have the highest pay out and how societal implications can impact the law.
How Race, Ethnicity and Gender Impact Your Life's Worth
This is an easy read that discusses the history, implications and possible solutions to unfair damages. Can be used when discussing damages calculations and can tie into a conversation of how Tort law is evolving.
"California Bars the Calculation of Tort Damages Based on Race, Gender, and Ethnicity"
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How Race, Ethnicity and Gender Impact Your Life's Worth
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"California Bars the Calculation of Tort Damages Based on Race, Gender, and Ethnicity"
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How Race, Ethnicity and Gender Impact Your Life's Worth
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Shorter v. Drury Supreme Court of Washington 695 P.2d 116 (1985)
Doreen and Elmer Shorter (plaintiffs) were Jehovah’s Witness, a faith prohibiting its followers from receiving blood transfusions. When Doreen was pregnant, she consulted with Dr. Robert Drury (defendant), a family practitioner who diagnosed her as having a “missed abortion,” a condition in which a fetus dies and the uterus fails to discharge it. To guard against infection, a dilation and curettage (D and C) was recommended. Of the three commonly-used methods to perform the procedure, Drury chose the method that posed the highest risk of bleeding due to possible puncture from the instrument used. Drury explained the procedure to Doreen, including the risk of bleeding, but failed to advise her of the two alternate methods. A second opinion obtained by Doreen confirmed the procedure as appropriate and warned her of the risk of significant blood loss. At the hospital, the Shorters signed a document releasing the hospital, physicians, and staff from all liability stemming from her refusal to accept blood if needed. During the procedure, Drury lacerated Doreen’s uterus causing her to bleed profusely. Physicians’ repeated attempts to have Doreen, as well as Elmer, consent to a blood transfusion were rejected. Doreen bled to death. Mr. Shorter filed a wrongful death action alleging Drury’s negligence proximately caused Doreen’s death. At trial, the release document was entered into evidence and the jury was instructed on assumption of the risk. The jury found Drury proximately caused Doreen’s death and awarded $412,000 in damages. That amount was reduced by 75 percent because the jury also found that the Shorters “knowingly and voluntarily” assumed the risk that refusing blood transfusions would result in Doreen’s death. Motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were filed by both parties, and denied by the court. Shorter appealed and Drury cross-appealed, but did not appeal the issue of his negligence.
Shorter v. Drury Supreme Court of Washington 695 P.2d 116 (1985)
A contract against liability for negligence will be held valid except in cases where the public interest is involved.
Shorter v. Drury Supreme Court of Washington 695 P.2d 116 (1985)
discussion of faith differences and treatments offered
Shorter v. Drury Supreme Court of Washington 695 P.2d 116 (1985)
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Shorter v. Drury Supreme Court of Washington 695 P.2d 116 (1985)
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United States v. Hatahley 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958)
Hatahley, et al. (plaintiffs), members of the Navajo tribe, brought suit against the United States (defendant) because federal agents wrongfully seized the plaintiffs’ horses and donkeys and had them sold to a horsemeat plant and glue factory. The plaintiffs did not prove the replacement cost of the animals, but claimed that they were specially trained and thus irreplaceable. The trial court therefore did not take into account replacement cost and rejected evidence of possible replacements in the area. Rather, relying on testimony, the trial court came up with an estimated value of the animals based on their trade value and awarded the plaintiffs $395 per taken animal. The trial court also awarded plaintiffs one-half of the decreased value of their herds of sheep, goats, and cattle as a result of the horses and donkeys being lost. This amount encompassed the plaintiffs’ losses from the time of seizure up to the last hearing in this case. Finally, the trial court awarded $3,500 to each plaintiff for pain and suffering. The United States appealed.
McMillan v. New York Eastern District Court of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (2008)
James McMillan (plaintiff), a black man, was seriously injured during the crash of a ferryboat negligently operated by the City of New York (City) (defendant). McMillan became a quadriplegic as a result of the crash and sued the City for negligence, claiming damages resulting from pain, suffering, and medical costs. A critical element in the calculation of damages was McMillan’s life expectancy. At a trial before the court and an advisory judge, the City introduced race-based statistical evidence showing that an African-American plaintiff with a spinal-cord injury would live a shorter life than a person of another race with a similar injury. The issue was whether a court could rely on race as a factor in the calculation of damages in a negligence case.
GMM v. Kimpson 92 F. Supp. 3d 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
an infant lead-poisoning claim against a defendant landlord that resulted in a two-week trial and a plaintiff’s verdict of about $2 million, the judge ruled that the testimony of three economics experts (two for the plaintiff and one for defendant) could not rely on assumptions based on ethnicity ‘ in that case, the fact that the infant was Hispanic. The July 30 Memorandum and Order explained the trial ruling and the reasons that such testimony is unconstitutional
United States v. Hatahley 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958)
The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party.
McMillan v. New York Eastern District Court of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (2008)
Race-based life-expectancy data may not be used to calculate damages in a negligence case.
GMM v. Kimpson 92 F. Supp. 3d 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
use of “ethnicity-based statistics” to obtain a reduced damage award in calculating future economic loss violates due process and equal protection.
United States v. Hatahley 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958)
introduction of racial conflicts regarding Native tribes
McMillan v. New York Eastern District Court of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (2008)
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GMM v. Kimpson 92 F. Supp. 3d 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
ethnicity-based economic loss calculations
United States v. Hatahley 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958)
McMillan v. New York Eastern District Court of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (2008)
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GMM v. Kimpson 92 F. Supp. 3d 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
United States v. Hatahley 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958)
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McMillan v. New York Eastern District Court of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (2008)
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GMM v. Kimpson 92 F. Supp. 3d 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
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Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 266 F.2d 326 1959
a damage suit was brought by certain colored passengers and his "apparently white wife," both of whom were natives of Jamaica, for injuries from an assault which occurred in Florida.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services United States Supreme Court
489 U.S. 189 (1989)
DeShaney (plaintiff) was a young boy who was severely beaten and permanently injured by his father, with whom he lived. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services (defendant) received complaints that DeShaney was being abused by his father. After a lengthy period of observation in which visits were made to DeShaney’s home and he was hospitalized for mysterious injuries, Winnebago had reason to believe DeShaney was being abused, but nonetheless did not act to remove him from his father’s custody. DeShaney sued Winnebago County under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in federal district court claiming that Winnebago’s failure to act deprived him of his liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Winnebago, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
Glenn Michael learned of a homosexual relationship between his former wife and Rita Plaxico. He subsequently filed for modification of child custody in November of 1993, against his former wife, to have their minor daughter placed in his custody. He alleged in this modification of child custody case, Michael v. Michael, that his former wife was engaged in a *** relationship with her roommate, Plaxico. During discovery of the child custody case, semi-nude pictures that had been obtained by Michael were produced by his attorney. These pictures show Plaxico in her bed nude from the waist up. Michael was subsequently awarded custody of his minor daughter. Plaxico filed suit in the Circuit Court of Tippah County against Michael for invasion of her privacy, specifically alleging in her pleadings, the sub-tort of "intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another." The parties, by mutual agreement, agreed to a trial without a jury. At trial, Michael stated that he watched his former wife and Plaxico engage in sexual conduct. It was at this time that Michael went to his truck to get a camera. He returned to the window and took pictures in order to obtain proof of their *** relationship. The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence, ruled on June 25, 1996, that Michael had a qualified privilege when he obtained the evidence of the relationship between Plaxico and his former wife in order to protect his child. The trial court then dismissed the complaint with prejudice and ordered that Plaxico pay the costs of the proceeding, and that both parties were responsible for their own attorney's fees. Plaxico appealed.
Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 266 F.2d 326 1959
we conclude that the danger should reasonably have been foreseen by Tamiami in time to act with the utmost care to avoid injury to its passengers, particularly by warning them and by not doing foolish things to increase their danger, and that Tamiami breached the duty owed to its passengers, the appellants
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services United States Supreme Court
489 U.S. 189 (1989)
Under substantive due process principles, there is no affirmative duty of the state to act to protect individuals from deprivations of their life, liberty, or property by other citizens, unless those citizens are prisoners held in custody against their will by the stat
Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
To recover for an invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must meet a heavy burden of showing a substantial interference with his seclusion of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary, reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object. Further, the plaintiff must show some bad faith or utterly reckless prying to recover on an invasion of privacy cause of action. However, the general rule is that there is no requirement of publication or communication to a third party in cases of intrusion upon a plaintiff's seclusion or solitude.
Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 266 F.2d 326 1959
battery based on race and appearance
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services United States Supreme Court
489 U.S. 189 (1989)
silencing of women's claims in legal disputes
Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
intrusion and seclusion and how it applied to LGBTQ+ individuals in this case
Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 266 F.2d 326 1959
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services United States Supreme Court
489 U.S. 189 (1989)
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Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
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Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 266 F.2d 326 1959
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services United States Supreme Court
489 U.S. 189 (1989)
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Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
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Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. 359 Mass. 319, 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971)
Plaintiff customer brought an action against defendant store for false imprisonment, after suffering a heart attack shortly after being stopped by a store employee before exiting the store and being escorted to see the manager because he was putting on a scarf taken out of his pocket. After trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. On appeal, the store alleged that the detention was reasonable under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 94B, which permitted a merchant to defend a false imprisonment claim by asserting that there were reasonable grounds for believing the person detained was attempting to commit larceny of goods. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. 359 Mass. 319, 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971)
The law is well settled that any general restraint is sufficient to constitute an imprisonment and any demonstration of physical power which, to all appearances, can be avoided only by submission, operates as effectually to constitute an imprisonment, if submitted to, as if any amount of force had been exercised. If a man is restrained of his personal liberty by fear of a personal difficulty, that amounts to a false imprisonment within the legal meaning of such term.
Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. 359 Mass. 319, 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971)
This case leads to interesting discussions of how we should think about people's suspicions of shoplifting, and how the race of the parties may affect those judgments. The case sets up the police as the gold standard for reasonableness. Self-defense, the shopkeeper's privilege, and the racial dimension of claims of "reasonable fear"
Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. 359 Mass. 319, 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971)
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Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. 359 Mass. 319, 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971)
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Long, Alex B., and Teri Dobbins Baxter. 2020. Torts: a modern approach. AVAILABLE VIA INTERLIBRARY LOAN (ILLiad)
Long, Alex B., and Teri Dobbins Baxter. 2020. Torts: a modern approach. AVAILABLE VIA INTERLIBRARY LOAN (ILLiad)
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Long, Alex B., and Teri Dobbins Baxter. 2020. Torts: a modern approach. AVAILABLE VIA INTERLIBRARY LOAN (ILLiad)
explicit coverage of race and gender-related issues; The text opens with a "Diversity and Inclusion Materials" section which lists how each chapter connects to "how issues of diversity and inclusion have been addressed, ignored, or dismissed by the civil justice system." It then includes an index of Diversity and Inclusion Materials by major topic [Fairness (Discrimination in Tort Law and Fairness (Discrimination in Tort Damages"] type (age, class, ethnicity, gender, LGBTQ, race, sexuality, etc.)
Long, Alex B., and Teri Dobbins Baxter. 2020. Torts: a modern approach. AVAILABLE VIA INTERLIBRARY LOAN (ILLiad)
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Long, Alex B., and Teri Dobbins Baxter. 2020. Torts: a modern approach. AVAILABLE VIA INTERLIBRARY LOAN (ILLiad)
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Walker v. Thompson 404 F.Supp.3d 819
After years of racial slurs and microaggressions at the workplace, plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint, along with retaliation claims based on Title IIV and failure to promote
Walker v. Thompson 404 F.Supp.3d 819
Holding that a hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment where evidence demonstrated years of inflammatory racial epithets
Walker v. Thompson 404 F.Supp.3d 819
racial slurs as IIED
Walker v. Thompson 404 F.Supp.3d 819
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Walker v. Thompson 404 F.Supp.3d 819
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Ruiz v. Bertolotti 37 Misc. 2d 1067 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
In sum the complaint states that the plaintiffs, who are Puerto Ricans, contracted to purchase a house in a residential section of Massapequa from one Farber, a builder; that the defendant learned of this and he, acting in concert with others, personally called on Farber and expressed anger at "colored persons" moving into the neighborhood, and threatened bodily harm to him, to plaintiffs and to plaintiffs' children, if the sale were consummated; that these threats were made with malice and for the purpose of communication to plaintiffs, in order to frighten them into agreeing to rescind the contract of sale; that these threats were communicated to plaintiffs by Farber and that plaintiffs were put in fear of their personal safety and that of their children as a result of which they entered into an agreement rescinding the contract of sale. It is further alleged that, as a result of these threats, both plaintiffs suffered distress, humiliation and emotional shock and were rendered sick and nervous, and that in addition plaintiff Manuel Ruiz suffered pecuniary damage in that he had to search for another dwelling and absent himself from his business.
Ruiz v. Bertolotti 37 Misc. 2d 1067 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
Deliberate and malevolent conduct, albeit confined to words, is at least as serious a matter, requiring the protection of the law to even a greater degree.
Ruiz v. Bertolotti 37 Misc. 2d 1067 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
intentional torts in an effort to racially restrict neighborhoods
Ruiz v. Bertolotti 37 Misc. 2d 1067 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
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Ruiz v. Bertolotti 37 Misc. 2d 1067 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
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Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
Glenn Michael learned of a homosexual relationship between his former wife and Rita Plaxico. He subsequently filed for modification of child custody in November of 1993, against his former wife, to have their minor daughter placed in his custody. He alleged in this modification of child custody case, Michael v. Michael, that his former wife was engaged in a *** relationship with her roommate, Plaxico. During discovery of the child custody case, semi-nude pictures that had been obtained by Michael were produced by his attorney. These pictures show Plaxico in her bed nude from the waist up. Michael was subsequently awarded custody of his minor daughter. Plaxico filed suit in the Circuit Court of Tippah County against Michael for invasion of her privacy, specifically alleging in her pleadings, the sub-tort of "intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another." The parties, by mutual agreement, agreed to a trial without a jury. At trial, Michael stated that he watched his former wife and Plaxico engage in sexual conduct. It was at this time that Michael went to his truck to get a camera. He returned to the window and took pictures in order to obtain proof of their *** relationship. The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence, ruled on June 25, 1996, that Michael had a qualified privilege when he obtained the evidence of the relationship between Plaxico and his former wife in order to protect his child. The trial court then dismissed the complaint with prejudice and ordered that Plaxico pay the costs of the proceeding, and that both parties were responsible for their own attorney's fees. Plaxico appealed.
Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
To recover for an invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must meet a heavy burden of showing a substantial interference with his seclusion of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary, reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object. Further, the plaintiff must show some bad faith or utterly reckless prying to recover on an invasion of privacy cause of action. However, the general rule is that there is no requirement of publication or communication to a third party in cases of intrusion upon a plaintiff's seclusion or solitude.
Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
intrusion and seclusion and how it applied to LGBTQ+ individuals in this case
Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
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Plaxico v. Michael - 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999)
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Oswald v. LeGrand 453 N.W.2d 634 (1990)
This appeal challenges a grant of summary judgment for medical professionals in a case involving the spontaneous abortion of a 19-22 week-old fetus. The trial court barred the plaintiffs from introducing expert testimony due to their failure to timely designate an expert in accordance with Iowa Code section 668.11(2) (1987). Accordingly, the district court determined that plaintiffs could not generate a material issue of fact concerning the defendants' negligence
Oswald v. LeGrand 453 N.W.2d 634 (1990)
Any situation involving death in the ED places relatives in an emotionally vulnerable position. Health care professionals should strive to provide sensitive care while avoiding inflammatory actions and statements that may cause further emotional distress to family members.
Oswald v. LeGrand 453 N.W.2d 634 (1990)
silencing of women's claims in legal disputes and medical settings
Oswald v. LeGrand 453 N.W.2d 634 (1990)
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Oswald v. LeGrand 453 N.W.2d 634 (1990)
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Garrett v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
On July 16, 1951, Brian Dailey (defendant), a five-year-old boy, was visiting at the home of Ruth Garratt (plaintiff). Garratt started to sit down in a lawn chair when Dailey moved it. Garratt fell, sustaining serious injuries, including a broken hip. Garratt sued Dailey for battery. At trial, Garratt’s sister testified that Dailey deliberated pulled the chair out from under Garratt. The trial court did not accept this version of events, however, and instead accepted the testimony of Dailey. Dailey claimed that he moved the chair to sit down in it, and despite his efforts, he was unable to replace the chair in time to stop Garratt’s fall. The trial court thus concluded that Dailey did not possess any “any willful [sic] or unlawful purpose” or intent to harm Garratt when he moved the chair. The judge dismissed the action against Dailey. The court then determined that Garratt had suffered some $11,000 in damages, in case the decision were to be overruled on appeal. Garratt appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, requesting entry of judgment in her favor or a new trial.
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co Court of Appeals of New York 539 N.E.2d 1069 (1989)
Around 300 companies manufactured and marketed the drug DES for use by pregnant women to prevent miscarriages. Many years later, female children of mothers who took DES began to develop vaginal cancer and other complications. Because of the time lapse, many mothers found it impossible to remember which company manufactured the particular DES pill that she took. Because of this, DES daughters found it difficult to prove which manufacturers were responsible for their injuries. In response, the New York legislature enacted a bill to revive DES actions barred by the statute of limitations. In this case, Hymowitz (plaintiff) sued Eli Lilly and other manufacturers of DES (defendants) for her injuries caused by DES. Eli Lilly moved for summary judgment on the ground that Hymowitz failed to prove which manufacturer produced the DES that caused the injury in question. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed the decision.
Garrett v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
A minor may be held liable for the tort of battery if she acted intentionally, with knowledge to a substantial certainty that her actions would cause a harmful or offensive contact to another person.
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co Court of Appeals of New York 539 N.E.2d 1069 (1989)
Under the New York approach, DES manufacturers are severally liable to a plaintiff in proportion to their national market shares, and a court cannot exculpate a manufacturer who produced and marketed DES for use by pregnant women but can prove that it did not cause the particular plaintiff’s injury.
Garrett v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
Liability insurance has a central place in torts regardless of the race of the participants, but distribution of liability insurance – and the extent to which plaintiffs are compensated – has been influenced by race and racism.
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co Court of Appeals of New York 539 N.E.2d 1069 (1989)
diverse women and low socio-economic groups in medical settings
Garrett v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
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Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co Court of Appeals of New York 539 N.E.2d 1069 (1989)
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Garrett v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
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Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co Court of Appeals of New York 539 N.E.2d 1069 (1989)
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Wassell v. Adams, 856 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989)
Susan Marisconish (plaintiff) checked into the Ron-Ric motel in September 1985 for the graduation of her fiancé, Michael Wassell, who was graduating from a nearby naval-training station. The Ron-Ric was owned by Wilbur and Florena Adams (defendants) and was located a few blocks away from a dangerous urban area. The Adamses did not warn Susan about the dangers of the area. One evening, Susan went looking for apartments in the area. After returning to the room, Susan locked the door and fell asleep. At 1:00 a.m., Susan was awoken by a knock at the door. Believing that her fiancé might be knocking, Susan opened the door. Instead, there was another man standing outside. Susan eventually let the man inside. After the man’s intentions became clear, Susan attempted to escape, but the man dragged her back into the room and raped her. There was no telephone or alarm system in the room that would have allowed Susan to contact someone for help. Susan brought a negligence suit against the Adamses. At district court, a jury returned an award of $850,000 for Susan, but found that Susan was 97 percent responsible due to her own negligence and reduced the award accordingly. Susan brought a motion to have the verdict overturned, but the judge denied the motion. Susan appealed the decision.
Wassell v. Adams, 856 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989)
Under a comparative negligence framework, fault may be determined by comparing the respective costs to the plaintiff and the defendant in avoiding the injury that lead to the negligence action
Wassell v. Adams, 856 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989)
discussion of how parties are portrayed in the case, i.e. "a respectably dressed black man" without naming the race of the other parties as a way to perpetuate the stereotype of the black man as a violent criminal, as unrespectable, and as poor
Wassell v. Adams, 856 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989)
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Wassell v. Adams, 856 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989)
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Scott v. Harris United States Supreme Court 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
A sheriff’s deputy in Georgia observed Harris (plaintiff) speeding on a highway. When the deputy attempted to pull Harris over, Harris fled. The original deputy and several others gave chase. The chase took place over ten miles at significant speeds. A camera in Deputy Timothy Scott’s (defendant) cruiser captured the chase. The video showed Harris driving at high speeds and swerving on the motorway as well as driving through red lights. During the chase, Scott asked his supervisor to allow him to perform a maneuver to Harris’ car that would force it to spin to a stop. The request was approved, but instead of performing the maneuver, Scott hit Harris’ back bumper, causing Harris’ car to leave the roadway and hit a tree in a nearby embankment. As a result of the crash, Harris became a quadriplegic. Harris sued Scott for violating Harris’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. Both parties agree that Scott’s actions constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Scott filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he enjoyed qualified immunity as a police officer. The district court denied his motion, holding that there were disagreements as to material facts. Scott appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Scott appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Scott v. Harris United States Supreme Court 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
(1) In deciding a summary judgment motion, all facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party unless no reasonable jury would be able to accept that version of the facts.
(2) The use of deadly force to terminate a high-speed vehicle chase does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Scott v. Harris United States Supreme Court 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
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Scott v. Harris United States Supreme Court 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
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Scott v. Harris United States Supreme Court 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
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Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County 1994
This petition seeks reversal of an order of summary adjudication made by the judge in charge of coordinated cases, given the coordination title of "Breast Implant Cases." The court ruled that the plaintiffs could not state a cause of action for strict liability based on design defect. This ruling is challenged on a number of grounds as discussed hereafter. Writ review of the order is authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section
Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County 1994
In Artiglio, the court expressly held that this determination can be made as a matter of law without the need for fact-finding, except for the sole factual determination that the device at issue is physician-directed and physician-applied (i.e., a "prescribed device").
Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County 1994
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Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County 1994
Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County 1994
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Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. Supreme Court of California 468 P.2d 216 (1970)
Manuel Alcorn (plaintiff) was a black man employed as a truck driver by Anbro Engineering, Inc. (Anbro) (defendant). One day, Alcorn told his Caucasian foreman and supervisor, Palmer, that Alcorn had informed another Anbro employee that the employee should not drive a truck to a certain site because the employee was not a member of the teamster’s union. In response, Palmer allegedly shouted at Alcorn, made demeaning remarks about Alcorn’s race, and informed Alcorn that he would be fired after completing his next assignment. Alcorn completed his job and reported the incident to Thomas Anderson Sr., one of Anbro’s owners. Anderson supported and ratified the comments made by Palmer, further demoralizing Alcorn. As a result of the events, Alcorn suffered humiliation, mental and physical distress, and physical illness, and was unable to work for weeks. Alcorn brought an action against Anbro and its employees to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial, the trial court granted Anbro’s demurrer to Alcorn’s third amended complaint, and Alcorn’s claim was dismissed. Alcorn appealed the decision.
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. Supreme Court of California 468 P.2d 216 (1970)
A plaintiff who has suffered only emotional distress may recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. Supreme Court of California 468 P.2d 216 (1970)
racial slurs and implicit bias in IIED and outrageous conduct
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. Supreme Court of California 468 P.2d 216 (1970)
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Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. Supreme Court of California 468 P.2d 216 (1970)
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Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
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Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
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Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
racial politics of heteronormativity; wrongful birth tort law as it applies to race and disability; eugenic inheritance of reproductive rights and racial inheritance
Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
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Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
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Littleton v. Prange 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999)
After Jonathan Littleton's death, Christie Littleton brought a medical malpractice suit against her husband's doctor, Mark Prange.The defense attorney argued that the marriage was invalid because Christie was a biological male. On appeal, Chief Justice Phil Hardberger relied on the fact that "Texas statutes do not allow same-sex marriages" and that "male chromosomes do not change with either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery" in handing down his judgment that "Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male. Her marriage to Jonathan was invalid, and she cannot bring a cause of action as his surviving spouse."
Littleton v. Prange 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999)
The decision made it legal for a cis woman to marry a trans woman who had undergone sex reassignment surgery and transitioned to female as long as the two partners were assigned opposite sexes at birth
Littleton v. Prange 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999)
discussion of gender and sexuality and how they apply to survival claims
Littleton v. Prange 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999)
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Littleton v. Prange 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999)
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